Introduction
This statement reflects the opinion of the Danish Accident Investigation Board regarding the circumstances of the occurrence and its causes and consequences.
In accordance with the provisions of EU Regulation 996/2010, the Danish Air Navigation Act and pursuant to Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Convention, the safety investigation is of an exclusively technical and operational nature, and its objective is not the assignment of blame or liability.
The safety investigation was carried out without having necessarily used legal evidence procedures and with no other basic aim than preventing future accidents and serious incidents.
Consequently, any use of this statement for purposes other than preventing future accidents and serious incidents may lead to erroneous or misleading interpretations.
A reprint with source reference may be published without separate permit.
General
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State file number: |
2025-362 |
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UTC date: |
2-8-2025 |
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UTC time: |
14:30 |
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Occurrence class: |
Serious incident |
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Location: |
Anholt (EKAT) |
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Injury level: |
None |
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Aircraft registration: |
SE-KMZ |
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Aircraft make/model: |
Piper PA-28R-201 Arrow III |
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Current flight rules: |
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) |
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Operation type: |
Private |
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Flight phase: |
Landing |
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Aircraft category: |
Fixed wing |
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Last departure point: |
Varberg (ESGV) |
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Planned destination: |
Anholt (EKAT) |
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Aircraft damage: |
Substantial |
Notification
All time references in this statement are Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
The Aviation Unit of the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) was notified of the accident by the airfield operator on 2-8-2025 at 14:47 hours (hrs).
The AIB notified the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the Danish Civil Aviation and Railway Authority (DCARA) on 4-8-2025 at 08:56.
Factual information
History of flight
The flight was a private VFR-flight from Varberg (ESGV) to Anholt (EKAT). The pilot had arranged a return flight for two friends from EKAT to ESGV.
The pilot arrived at ESGV later than planned, and felt some concern and stress associated to achieving the agreed departure time from EKAT.
After takeoff from ESGV, the pilot climbed to 3,000 ft for cruise towards EKAT.
During the approach for runway 21, the pilot reduced airspeed below 130 kt and selected the landing gear down. The pilot sensed the landing gear extending and observed a further reduction in airspeed due to increased drag.
The pilot reduced the airspeed further and selected full flaps for landing. Witnesses on the ground noticed that the landing gear was only partially (halfway) extended. The pilot was unaware that the landing gear was not fully extended.
The pilot normally performed a final GUMPS check (Gasoline, Undercarriage, Mixture, Propeller, Switches) before landing. Contrary to his normal operating procedure, the pilot missed checking the landing gear indicators.
Upon touchdown, the landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft skidded approximately 50 metres on the ground before coming to a stop. After removing his Active Noise Reduction (ANR) headset, the pilot noticed the “landing gear not down” aural alert.
The serious incident occurred in daylight under Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).
Injuries to persons
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Injuries |
Crew |
Passengers |
Others |
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Fatal |
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Serious |
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None |
1 |
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Damage to aircraft
The aircraft sustained damage to the propeller, minor damage to the right-side fuselage structure in the area of the step behind the wing, and minor damage to the inboard part of the flaps.
Technical investigation
The circuit breaker for the landing gear hydraulic pump was found activated (popped).
When the aircraft was lifted from the ground, the free-fall extension handle was pulled, and the landing gear extended.
After the aircraft was placed on jacks, the landing gear hydraulic pump circuit breaker was reset, and the landing gear was cycled three times without the circuit breaker activating. The cause for the circuit breaker activation during flight was not determined.
The landing gear indication system (three green lights and a red gear transit light) was functional and indicated correctly during the tests.
A functional test of the “landing gear not down” aural warning system was performed without remarks.
AIB safety investigation process
Contact the Accident Investigation Board
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