Accident to OY-9485 near Ringsted (EKRS) on 8-8-2025

The flight was a local VFR flight from Ringsted (EKRS).

The aircraft took off from runway 23. Approximately five minutes after take-off and during cruise at approximately at 2,000 feet (ft) the engine suddenly stalled. The pilot turned towards EKRS. The pilot tried to restart the engine by cranking several times without success.

The pilot contacted Copenhagen Information and explained that the engine had stopped south of EKRS, and that he would return to EKRS.

The pilot realized he would not reach EKRS and began preparing for a forced landing in a field.

The pilot chose an agricultural field to the right of the track towards EKRS.

During the flare the aircraft hit the ground hard. The nose landing gear and the right hand main landing gear were torn off. The aircraft turned approximately 180 degrees forward over the nose section and came to a rest in an inverted position.

The pilot released his lap seat belt and evacuated the aircraft.

Approximately two to three minutes after the pilot’s initial contact to Copenhagen Information, the pilot of another aircraft which had just departed from EKRS, informed Copenhagen information that an aircraft had crashed in a field south of EKRS.

Copenhagen Information initiated a search and rescue operation.

Figure 1. Flight track

Figure 2. Destroyed aircraft at the accident site

The nose section of the aircraft broke off just aft of the firewall.

The nose landing gear and the right hand main landing gear were torn off.

None.

The AIB received a copy of the voice recordings between the pilot and Copenhagen Information. 

The voice recordings were of good quality and useful for the AIB safety investigation.

The aircraft had a Kanardia Nesis III EFIS (Electronic Flight Information System) installed, which recorded flight and engine parameters.

The AIB downloaded recorded data from the instrument. The data was generally of good quality and useful for the investigation, however, due to power interruptions the last final seconds of the flight were missing.

Figure 4. Impact marks - right hand main landing gear - nose landing gear and left hand main landing gear.

The compass direction of the ground marks were measured to 110°.

The aircraft was fitted with lap and shoulder seat belts.

The lap and shoulder seat belts and their attachments to the fuselage structure were inspected without remarks.  

The pilot only used the lap seat belt.

The pilot’s injuries were broken ribs and a fractured hip socket.

Shortly after the accident a HEMS (Helicopter Emergency Medical Service) helicopter,  based at EKRS, arrived at the accident site.

The pilot was flown to the hospital.

The pilot was properly licenced.

The takeoff mass of the aircraft was within the limits.

The aircraft had a valid Permit to Fly.

After the engine stalled, the pilot maintained an IAS of 80-90 km/h, 30-40 km/h lower than the recommended engine out speed of 120 km/h.

The lower IAS resulted in a shorter gliding distance, forcing the pilot to attempt an off-field landing.

The pilot did not follow the AFOM checklist for engine failure in flight regarding IAS and flap setting.

The aircraft was flared and landed in tail wind conditions. According to the AFOM this should be avoided. The AFOM did not state any maximum tailwind component.

The pilot landed the aircraft in a tailwind, which was gusting up to 22-24 km/h (12-13 kt).

A tailwind during the final descent and flare may have contributed to a perception of adequate airspeed due to the increased groundspeed, despite the aircraft’s actual IAS being lower than perceived. This could have adversely affected the pilot’s judgement and aircraft handling during the flare. With a lower-than-required IAS during the flare, the available lift would have been insufficient to effectively arrest the descent rate, resulting in a hard land-ing destroying the aircraft.

Based on the ground marks and the damages to the aircraft it is most likely that the aircraft hit the ground hard during the landing.

The pilot did not drain the aircraft as there were no drain valves or gasculators installed, and the pilot did not think water was prone to accumulate in the fuel tanks.

The water in the fuel tanks likely accumulated over time since the pilot had not drained the fuel tanks recently.

The water in the carburetor fuel float chambers came from the wing fuel tanks.

The engine stalled due to water in the carburetor fuel float chambers.

The accident was survivable although the forward part of the cabin/cockpit broke off.

The lap seat belt was effective of keeping the pilot to his seat. However, if the pilot had been wearing the shoulder seat belt, his upper body would have been restrained more effectively, and the deceleration forces would have been distributed more equally to his body. This would most likely have reduced the severity of the pilot’s injuries.

Although the aircraft was inverted, it was easy for the pilot to evacuate the aircraft.

The aircraft manufacturer installed as standard on later built aircraft, a gasculator at the lowest point of the fuel line in the engine compartment.
In addition, the AFOM for these aircraft have been revised to require draining of the fuel system before each flight.

The aircraft manufacturer had not demonstrated that the gascolator was capable of effectively draining all water from the lowest parts of the wing tanks. However, the POH stated that, if contamination in the form of water or dirt was detected during fuel draining through the gascolator, qoute: - "it is necessary to drain all fuel and clean the fuel system."

The AIB considers it important to drain the fuel system, especially if the fuel used is unleaded octane 95, since this type of fuel absorbs moisture from the air.

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