Introduction

This statement reflects the opinion of the Danish Accident Investigation Board regarding the circumstances of the occurrence and its causes and consequences.

In accordance with the provisions of EU Regulation 996/2010, the Danish Air Navigation Act and pursuant to Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Convention, the safety investigation is of an exclusively technical and operational nature, and its objective is not the assignment of blame or liability.

The safety investigation was carried out without having necessarily used legal evidence procedures and with no other basic aim than preventing future accidents and serious incidents.

Consequently, any use of this statement for purposes other than preventing future accidents and serious incidents may lead to erroneous or misleading interpretations.

A reprint with source reference may be published without separate permit.

General

State file number:

2025-614

UTC date:

20-12-2025

UTC time:

14:00

Occurrence class:

Serious incident

Location:

Copenhagen, Kastrup (EKCH)

Injury level:

Serious

Aircraft registration:

TC-SOM

Aircraft make/model:

Boeing 737-8 Max

Current flight rules:

Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)

Operation type:

Scheduled

Operated by:

SunExpress Airlines

Flight phase:

Pushback

Aircraft category:

Fixed wing

Last departure point:

EKCH

Planned destination:

Antalya (LTAI)

Aircraft damage:

None

Notification

All time references in this statement are Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

The Aviation Unit of the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) was notified of the serious incident by the EKCH Operations Centre on 20-12-2025 at 14:26 hours (hrs).

The AIB notified the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Transport Safety Investigation Center of the Republic of Turkey (UEIM), the United States (US) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Danish Civil Aviation and Railway Authority (DCARA) on 5-1-2026 at 13:23 hrs.

Factual information

History of flight

The serious incident occurred during pushback and engine start-up on a flight from Copenhagen, Kastrup (EKCH) to Antalya (LTAI).

A passenger sitting in seat 22B carried a rechargeable Lithium-ion power bank in her right-hand trouser pocket. The power bank experienced a thermal runaway, and the passenger threw the power bank onto the cabin floor in front of her seat.

The power bank emitted strong heat, sparks, smoke and flames, and close-by passengers rushed away both to the front and to the rear of the cabin.  

At the same time, the cabin crew had completed the cabin safety briefing, and the Senior Cabin Crew Member (SCCM) station 1L (position front door left) was walking from the rear of the cabin towards the front. She observed passengers rushing towards her, and she understood some kind of situation/emergency had occurred. The SCCM used crowd control to force her way forward, and when she approached the overwing section of the cabin she heard passengers saying “fire”.

The SCCM observed a flash of flames between the seats on the left-hand side, and she tried to notify the other cabin crew members by the use of the passenger chime. The SCCM urged close-by passengers to move away from the fire, and passengers seating further away to sit or remain seated, in order for the cabin crew to be able to deal with the fire.

The SCCM decided to warn the other cabin crew members and to retrieve firefighting equipment. She moved forward in the aircraft, retrieved a halon (BCF) fire extinguisher and shouted to the station 1R (position front door right) cabin crew member in the forward galley;

  • that there was a fire close to the overwing section
  • that she would initiate firefighting procedures
  • and that the cockpit flight crew and the remaining cabin crew had to be informed of the fire. 

Meanwhile, the two cabin crew members in the rear galley also understood that there was a fire in the overwing section of the cabin. The station 3L (position rear door left) cabin crew member used the aircraft interphone system to inform the cockpit flight crew and the remaining forward cabin crew member. 

The flight crew shut down the aircraft engines and called via radio for assistance from the airport Rescue and FireFighting Services (RFFS).

The SCCM returned to seat row 22 and discharged halon towards the power bank. The power bank fire was extinguished, but the power bank continued to spark, and the SCCM discharged more halon for spark suppression. It took approximately 15-20 seconds from the time the SCCM first observed the fire until the halon-based fire suppression was initiated. 

The 3L cabin crew member arrived with another halon fire extinguisher, which the SCCM took before ordering the cabin crew 3L to get a waste bin and water to cool down the power bank. When the 3L cabin crew returned shortly after, she donned protective gloves, grabbed the power bank and placed it in a water filled plastic waste bin, before adding another large bottle of water into the waste bin. 

The 3L cabin crew placed the waste bin with the power bank into the aft right lavatory and took up fire guard.

The power bank submerged in water in the waste bin.
Figure 1. The power bank submerged in water in the waste bin.

The SCCM urged the injured passenger from seat 22B to go to the front of the cabin to receive first aid treatment. The SCCM then responded to a call from the cockpit. 

The SCCM informed the commander that;

  • the fire had been put out
  • the power bank was secured
  • the 1R cabin crew member and a passenger who was a medical doctor provided first aid to the injured passenger.  

Shortly after, the airport RFFS services arrived. RFFS personnel took over the first aid treatment of the injured passenger, who subsequently was taken by ambulance to a hospital for further treatment.

Injuries to persons

Injuries

Crew

Passengers

Others

Fatal

 

 

 

Serious

 

1

 

Minor/None

 

 

 

The 14-year-old female passenger got an approximately 10 centimetre long second degree burn injury on her right upper inner thigh.

Damage to aircraft

Minor burn marks to the cabin floor carpet at seat row 22.


Figure 2. Minor burn marks to the cabin floor carpet.

Additional information

According to the cabin crew, standing/moving/shouting passengers hampered;

  • cabin crew verbal and visual communication
  • cabin crew movement through the cabin. 

On 27-5-2025, EASA issued Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No. 2025-03:
“Passenger and Crew Awareness on the Risks of Lithium Batteries” – see:

https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2025-03

AIB safety investigation process

Upon ending the preliminary safety investigation, the AIB decided - in accordance with article 5 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 138 of the Danish Air Navigation Act - not to conduct any further safety investigations. With reference to article 16 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 143 of the Danish Air Navigation Act, this statement closes the AIB safety investigation.

Contact the Accident Investigation Board

If you have any questions about this publication, please feel free to contact us.

Email: aib@aib.dk

Phone: +45 33 14 70 80