Introduction
This statement reflects the opinion of the Danish Accident Investigation Board regarding the circumstances of the occurrence and its causes and consequences.
In accordance with the provisions of EU Regulation 996/2010, the Danish Air Navigation Act and pursuant to Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Convention, the safety investigation is of an exclusively technical and operational nature, and its objective is not the assignment of blame or liability.
The safety investigation was carried out without having necessarily used legal evidence procedures and with no other basic aim than preventing future accidents and serious incidents.
Consequently, any use of this statement for purposes other than preventing future accidents and serious incidents may lead to erroneous or misleading interpretations.
A reprint with source reference may be published without separate permit.
General
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State file number: |
2026-36 |
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UTC date: |
18-1-2026 |
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UTC time: |
13:20 |
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Occurrence class: |
Serious incident |
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Location: |
Nuuk (BGGH) |
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Injury level: |
None |
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Aircraft registration: |
OY-GRG |
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Aircraft make/model: |
De Havilland Aircraft of Canada / DHC-8-202 |
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Current flight rules: |
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) |
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Operation type: |
Scheduled |
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Operated by: |
Air Greenland |
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Flight phase: |
Climbing |
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Aircraft category: |
Fixed wing |
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Last departure point: |
Nuuk (BGGH) |
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Planned destination: |
Narsarsuaq (BGBW) |
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Aircraft damage: |
Minor |
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Engine make/model: |
2 x Pratt & Whitney Canada PW123C |
Notification
All time references in this statement are Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
The Aviation Unit of the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) was notified of the serious incident by the operator on 18-1-2026 at 15:08 hours (hrs).
The AIB notified the Danish Civil Aviation and Railway Authority (DCARA), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) on 19-1-2026 at 13:33 hrs.
Factual information
History of flight
During climb out from Nuuk (BGGH) at approximately 7,000 feet, a strong smell of burned rubber was noticed by the flight crew, followed by visible flames and sparks coming from the Right Hand (RH) windshield terminal block. The flight crew switched off the windshield heat, which extinguished the flames and stopped the sparks
Due to residual smoke in the cockpit, the flight crew donned the oxygen masks and stopped the climb at 9,000 feet. An immediate return to BGGH was initiated, and the aircraft landed safely.
This serious incident occurred in daylight and under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).
Technical investigation
The operator conducted a technical investigation, which identified the RH windshield as the source of a short circuit. The short circuit led to overheating and melting of the RH windshield terminal block. The “Windshield R/H Heat” 115V Circuit Breaker was found popped during the event.
Figure 1. Damage to RH windshield terminal block.
Meteorological information
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METAR BGGH |
181320Z 30008KT 260V360 1700 -SN FEW005 SCT007 OVC016 M05/M05 Q0983= |
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METAR BGGH |
181350Z 31007KT 240V030 2600 -SN SCT007 BKN009 OVC014 M05/M06 Q0986= |
AIB safety investigation process
Contact the Accident Investigation Board
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